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Regulating the Blue Crab, Callinectes sapidus, Fishery 
Of Virginia: Biological and Economic Concerns 
J.E. Kirkley, W.O. DuPaul, and M. Oesterling1 
Introduction 
The blue crab, Callinectes sapiclus, fishery has been 
one of the most important fisheries of Virginia. The 
importance of the fishery in terms of commercial 
activities has substantially increased in recent years in 
response to declining resource levels of American 
Oyster, Crassostrea virginica, and a growing 
international and domestic demand for soft crabs, 
female hard crabs, and crab meat. 
The actual economic importance of the fishery, 
however, is not well known. For example, what are the 
employment and earning levels generated by the 
fishery? What portion of a waterman's household 
income is derived from crabbing? How much does 
crabbing contribute to state tax revenues? How do 
regulations affect the economies of coastal 
communities, and what are the economic impacts on 
processors, seafood dealers, restaurants, and providers 
of fishing supplies and services? Answers to these 
questions are necessary to manage the resource in the 
best interests of Virginia. 
There are many other questions about the blue crab 
fishery and resource that also must be answered. What 
are the current and optimum levels of harvests, effort, 
and fishing mortality? Volstad et al. (1994) suggest 
that fishing mortality (F) was extremely high in 1993.2 
Rothschild ct al. (1993) suggest that 
1 Fisheries Management Working Paper, 12/94 
College of William and Mary 
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"Volstad, J.B. Rothschild, and T. Maurer. 1994. 
Abundance estimation and population dynamics of the 
blue crab in the Chesapeake Bay. Maryland 
Department of Natural Resources, Annapolis, Md. 
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resource managers be concerned with the high apparent 
rate of fishing mortality, particularly given the 
variability in stock size over time.3 How valid and 
stable is the relationship between recruitment and 
spawning stock biomass? What is the relationship 
between water quality, abundance, current harvest 
levels, fishing and natural mortality, and future 
recruitment? 
A major problem which must be considered in 
evaluating the biological and economic importance and 
management of the fishery is the biological and 
economic interactions between the Maryland and 
Virginia crab fisheries. What are the state relationships 
and interactions between resource abundance and 
availability, reproductive act1V1t1es, harvests, 
regulation, and recruitment patterns? How would the 
fishery of one state be affected by various regulations 
imposed by the other state? 
Informed resource management requires answers to 
the previously posed questions. There appears to be, 
nevertheless, an urgent need to better manage and 
regulate the resource and the fishery. In this brief 
paper, we provide an overview of regulatory options for 
managing and regulating the blue crab fishery. We 
initially focus on open-access strategies and 
subsequently present a discussion of regulations that 
address the common-property, open-access, fishery. 
Prior to discussing management options, we discuss 
goals and objectives of resource management. 
3Rothschild, B., J. Ault, E. Patrick, S. Smith, H. Li, T. 
Maurer, B. Daugherty, G. Davis, C. Zhang, and R. 
McGarvey. 1992. Assessment of the Chesapeake Bay 
Blue Crab Stock. Univ. of MD. Chesapeake Bay 
Biological Lab. DB92-003-036, CEES 07-4-30 307, 
Solomons, Maryland. 
Goals and Objectives of Resource Management 
Management and regulation of the blue crab fishery 
has primarily focused on resource conservation and 
industry maintenance. That is, resource conservation is 
of primary concern but conservation cannot be so 
stringent that people become unemployed. Under this 
strategy, the Virginia Marine Resources Commission 
(VMRC) has had to constantly balance and assess 
trade-offs between the current and future well-being of 
the industry and the resource. Under such a strategy, 
biological and economic problems will nearly always 
occur for the fishery in question. Simply, resource 
abundance, age classes, biomass levels, economic 
opportunities, and social benefits will be jeopardized if 
management does not have clearly defined goals and 
objectives that integrate the underlying population 
dynamics and economic aspects of the fishery (i.e., a 
bio-economic optimum). 
There arc strong arguments being made to change the 
management and regulatory policies for the blue crab 
fishery. It is currently the opinion of VMRC and 
research scientists that the blue crab resource is in 
serious trouble. Between 1990 and 1992, reported 
landings of blue crab plummeted by more than 50%,. 
Over the last 50 years, however, blue crab landings 
have exhibited regular periodicity or cyclic behavior in 
which landings rapidly decline to very low levels. 
Scientists arc concerned, though, that the resource may 
not be simply following the normal cycle of ups and 
downs. 
Changing the management and regulatory policies 
begs the question "What arc the goals and objectives of 
blue crab management?" The goals and objectives of 
managing any fishery in Virginia are given in General 
Provision (28.2-203, p. 21) "Laws of Virginia Relating 
to The Marine Resources of The Commonwealth." It 
states "Conservation and management measures shall 
prevent overfishing while achieving the optimum yield 
from each fishery. The "optimum yield" of a fishery 
means the amount of fish or shellfish which will 
provide the greatest overall benefit to the 
Commonwealth, with particular reference to 
commercial fishing for food production and to 
recreational fishing." 
Unfortunately, the state's concept of optimum yield 
(OY) is quite vague. As stated in General Provision 
28.2-203, numerous interpretations arc possible. The 
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state could manage for maximum economic 
opportu111t1es in terms of employment and earnings. 
Alternatively, the 
state could attempt to maximize the economic concept 
of net benefits. Last, the state could simply try to 
maximize production or landings of blue crabs. 
There is, however, an agreement between Maryland 
and Virginia which specifics the goal of managing blue 
crabs as "to manage blue crabs in a way which 
conserves and protects the ecological value of the stock, 
and at the same time generates the greatest long term 
economic and social benefits from the resource. "4 
While there is a stated goal, it is vague and does not 
specify an actual optimum yield (OY) for blue crabs. 
What exactly does it mean to conserve the baywidc 
stock, protect the ecological value of blue crabs, and 
optimize the long-term use of the resource? Moreover, 
if management is to generate the maximum long-term 
economic and social benefits from the resource, VMRC 
will have to initiate a substantial economic data 
collection program. The state currently has mandatory 
reporting but the program docs not collect information 
on economic performance such as costs and earnings. 
Without the necessary specification of OY and 
economic information, the management and regulation 
of the blue crab fishery will be difficult. Alternatively, 
an arbitrary OY might be set equal to the long-term 
average annual harvest. This would closely parallel the 
objective of maintaining the industry. This OY, 
however, creates the risk of resource problems. If the 
empirical-based long-term yield is in error 
( overestimate of maximum annual harvest) of the actual 
long-term potential yield, it is possible to easily 
overharvest the blue crab resource. The long-term yield 
also completely ignores the social and economic 
importance of the fishery. 
Even though the VMRC and the bi-state fishery 
management plan (FMP) do not have well specified 
objectives and a stated OY, it is, nevertheless, possible 
to provide some general guidance on managing and 
regulating the blue crab fishery. In particular, we can 
examine several possible goals and objectives of 
resource management in relation to various types of 
fishery regulations. 
4Chcsapcake Bay Executive Council, 1989. 
Chesapeake Bay llluc Crab Management Plan. 
Annapolis, MD: Chesapeake Bay Program. 
We first explore the option that the state might want to 
rebuild or increase the resource as quickly as possible. 
If this were the case, VMRC would only have to 
impose an extremely restrictive limit on harvesting 
activities until the resource obtained its desired level. 
Extremely restrictive catch limits would, of course, 
cause severe economic hardships for watermen, seafood 
dealers, and processors. 
Under the scenario of resource conservation first and 
industry second, management could easily establish 
regulatory policies (Figure 1 ): ( 1) when the resource 
(X) is below the desired target level (X*), catch is
constrained to zero or nearly zero, and (2) if the
resource is above the desired target level, management
allows catch to equal the actual resource level minus
the target level.
Figure 1. Blue Crab, Callinectes sapidus, Resource 
Recovery Strategy, Minimize Time 
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The third possibility--when resource abundance 
equals the desired target lcvel--poses the most difficult 
problem for VMRC. In theory, when actual stock 
equals desired stock, the management agency should 
set the harvest such that benefits to society arc 
maximized. The state and the citizens of the 
Commonwealth should derive the maximum possible 
benefits from the resource. Alternatively, the 
objectives of management, whatever they are, should be 
realized at minimum cost. 
What if the state had the objective of maximizing 
sustainable yield or harvest levels? This objective 
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would require the state to restrict catch or effort to 
levels yielding the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) 
(Figure 2). Alternatively, the state would have to 
maintain resource conditions at a given level such that 
maximum sustainable yield could be realized. The 
same rule would apply to the state attempting to 
maintain any given level of resource. 
Figure 2. Sustainable Yield Curve and MSY 
MSY 
catch • 
MSY 
MSY level 
.-of fishing 
effort 
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What exactly is maximum sustainable yield? MSY is 
a long-run equilibrium concept; it is simply the 
maximum harvest level that can be sustained over time. 
Alternatively, MSY is the maximum possible average 
annual harvest such that additions or growth to the 
resource equals removals from the resource. If the 
actual harvest exceeds MSY, it is often stated that the 
resource is being overfished. If the harvest is less than 
MSY, management may allow harvest levels to 
increase. 
What is wrong with the objective of MSY? Extensive 
research has shown that MSY is generally very 
unstable. If MSY is the least bit overestimated, 
depletion or even extinction of the resource stock is 
possible. MSY is typically not really sustainable over 
the long run; environmental conditions and other 
factors cause substantial fluctuations in the resource 
stock. In the case of the blue crab fishery or any short­
lived marine species, environmental fluctuations are 
likely to be extremely important factors contributing to 
resource levels. Last, maximum sustainable yield, safe 
yield or harvest, maximum yield per recruit, and similar 
regulatory targets are primarily biological objectives; 
they ignore social and economic considerations of 
renewable resource management. 
Previous and current blue crab regulations suggest 
that the state is quite concerned with the underlying 
economics and not only with resource conservation. If 
Virginia only wanted to pursue conservation, the state 
could adopt policies consistent with those suggested in 
Figure I or 2. 
Unfortunately, the state does not have clearly 
specified operational objectives. It is not possible, 
therefore, to adequately determine the best management 
and regulatory strategy for blue crabs unless certain 
assumptions about the objectives of regulating the blue 
crab fishery arc made. In the following discussion, we 
assume the VMRC desires to restore the resource but is 
concerned about the economic ramifications of various 
regulatory options. 
The Blue Crab Fishery: 
Simple or Complex'? 
The blue crab fishery is a single species fishery. 
Resource issues under the purview of VMRC involve 
the Chesapeake Bay, its tributaries, and the territorial 
sea (ocean waters out to 3 miles). That is, the resource 
management area is relatively small and localized in 
comparison to the large offshore fisheries. The two 
primary sources of landings and fishing mortality arc 
commercial watermen and recreational crabbers. 
Unfortunately, little information is available on the 
recreational crab fishery. Unlike recreational finfishing 
in Virginia, recreational crabbers are not required to 
have a license unless they intend to use more than one 
pot per crabber. It is, therefore, difficult to determine 
the number of recreational crabbers in Virginia. Based 
on a 1988 survey, the National Marine Fisheries 
Service estimated that there were approximately 
200,000 recreational crabbers over the age of I 5 
harvesting blue crabs in Virginia. It is quite likely that 
there arc many more recreational crabbers than reported 
by the National Marine Fisheries Service. Moreover, 
there appears to be a growing number of individuals 
that exploit blue crabs for pleasure and subsistence. 
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The recreational harvest of blue crabs is not known. 
It also is not known what portion of the recreational 
harvest is commercially sold. Commercial and 
recreational crabbers, however, have recently 
complained about each other. Commercial crabbers 
have indicated a concern that recreational crabbers are 
catching too many crabs and/or possibly selling crabs. 
Recreational crabbers have complained that the 
commercial crabbers arc harvesting too much of the 
resource. In addition, recreational boaters have 
complained that crab pots arc interfering with 
recreational boating. In the future, the state may have 
to address the potential problems of user conllict among 
recreational and commercial crabbers and recreational 
boaters. 
In contrast to the recreational fishery, there is 
extensive information available on the commercial 
fishery. Seven types of gear are used to exploit the 
resource, but crab pots account for the majority of 
reported catch (Table 1 ). 
Table I. Virginia Blue Crab Landings, Gear Type 
Landings 
Year Trap" Pot Dredge Total 
---------------------1000 lbs--------------------
1973 12.27 27717.6 8880.7 36747.2 
1974 0.00 32713.1 8083.0 40849.4 
1975 1.28 30225.6 4461.6 34819.0 
1976 0.47 19669.7 6090.8 25760.9 
1977 33.60 31003.9 6123.8 37177.2 
1978 5.46 29437.1 6606.5 36055.1 
1979 0.22 32681.5 7106.0 39834.3 
1980 3.04 28166.7 9443.2 37691.4 
1981 0.00 3 I 708.2 10294.5 42044.1 
1982 64.19 36193.4 7678.1 44027.4 
1983 1.08 39798.0 6292.5 46104.1 
1984 0.04 38789.9 10663.7 49463.7 
1985 2.91 33987.0 6569.6 40732.8 
1986 0.49 301.8 8200.1 37527.0 
1987 0.14 28792.6 4770.5 33591.6 
•Peeler pound trap.
Source of Data:Virginia Marine Resource Commission. 
Although the fishery is a single species fishery, there 
arc several products landed. Hard crabs are marketed 
by size and sex. Peelers and soft crabs are two other 
product forms of Callinectes sapidus. Taking the 
market chain one step up, there is the problem that what 
is landed partly determines the processed product form. 
For example, large crabs may be processed as jumbo 
lump while smaller crabs may be converted to lump, 
special meat, mixed meat, and cocktail claws; all of 
which have different values in the market. 
The fishery is, thus, a complex multiproduct fishery 
with many different products. Multiproduct fisheries 
are extremely difficult to manage for either 
conservation or economic purposes. In the blue crab 
fishery, regulations af
f
ecting size and sex of crabs 
landed will affect not only the harvesting sector but will 
also substantially affect the economic returns of 
processors and dealers. 
The blue crab fishery is a year-round fishery. The 
hard and soft crab fisheries, however, have known 
seasonality in landings. Landings of hard crabs are 
highest between June and September and during the 
month of Dccernber when seasonal holiday demand is 
high and the dredge fishery begins. Landings or 
production of soft crabs are highest between May and 
August which coincides with the availability of peeler 
crabs. 
Hard crab landings appear to be the dominant source 
of fishing mortality (Table 2). Detailed data on the 
production and economic returns of soft-shell crab 
shedding operations arc not available. There is an issue 
of the accuracy of blue crab landings; industry 
comments and results of a survey by Rhodes and 
Shabman (1994) suggest that reported landings may 
equal slightly more than one-third of the actual 
landings.5 That is, reported landings are thought to be 
in error (underestimated) either because of misreporting 
or non-reporting of the apparent increasing basket trade 
in which crabs are sold to buyers who typically do not 
report landings. 
Available data on Virginia landings suggest that 
the first priority of management should be directed 
5Rhodes, and L. Shabman. 1994. Blue Crab Pot 
Fishery: The Issues and Concerns. Virginia Sea 
Grant Report No. 94-09. 
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towards hard crabs. The hard crab fishery is the 
apparent dominant source of fishing mortality. If we 
examine landings of hard crabs over recent years, it 
becomes relatively clear that the blue crab resource and 
fishery are in trouble (Figure 3). 
Table 2. Landings of Blue Crabs, 1986- I 992 
Year 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Landings 
Hard Soft 
--1000 lbs--
35527 949 
33592 562 
37096 113 I 
43150 1252 
47840 931 
44056 1337 
23348 519 
Value 
Hard Soft·' 
---$1000--, 
9090 J095 
10055 823 
11947 1670 
12288 2664 
1541 I 1745 
)()322 1717 
9073 1394 
asoft and peeler crab landings and value. 
Source: Virginia Marine Resources Commision. 
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Figure 3. Hard Blue Crab Landings, 
Virginia, 1944-1992 
0'-----�-----�-----
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Landings declined by more than 50% between 1990 and 
1992 (47.8 vs. 23.3 million pounds). The landings data 
may also rcnect a shift in marketing strategy by 
watermen. It is believed that watermen increased their 
direct marketing or sales of basket crabs and possibly 
decreased their sales of crabs to picking houses. If this 
is the case, it is quite possible that the reported decline 
in crab landings is not at all indicative of the actual 
trend in blue crab landings. 
There also appears to be a possible predictable cycle 
in landings. Landings of hard blue crabs appear to 
dramatically decline every 16-18 years (Figure 3). In 
the past, recovery of landings has usually been quite 
rapid. In the current situation, the resource does not 
appear to be rapidly recovering. It is not known 
whether or not resource declines experienced in 1992, 
1993, and 1994 arc indicative of long-run patterns or 
related to overfishing and environmental degradation. 
The VMRC, however, has few control points for 
improving resource levels (e.g., they cannot regulate 
environmental and climatic conditions). The VMRC 
must focus on regulating the fishery to manage the 
resource. 
Even in the absence of a resource problem, there is a 
perceived economic problem. There is likely to be too 
much effort or individuals in the fishery which causes 
profits per operating unit and economic efficiency to 
decline to unnecessarily low levels. Alternatively, less 
effort would allow higher returns per operating unit and 
increased benefits to the Commonwealth. 
Reliable effort data, such as number of boats, 
manpower, days at sea, boat characteristics, and trap or 
pot days, arc not available. Pishery scientists have 
suggested, however, that fishing effort is too high and 
needs to be reduced to enhance resource recovery and 
provide the maximum benefits to the state of Virginia. 
The crab pot fishery, the major source of fishing 
mortality, is an open-access, common property fishery. 
There is also, however, a delayed entry restriction that 
delays new entrants from entering the fishery for two 
years. Under a conventional open-access regime, 
anyone that wants to enter the fishery may do so. Thus, 
as long as a proffr can be realized, entry will occur. 
Under the common property condition, no one entity 
owns the resource and its use is relatively free. Since 
the cost of using the resource is free, exploiters will 
tend to overharvest the resource (this is like an 
employer not having to pay its employees). 
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It is because of the open-access nature and common 
property problem of fisheries that economists and 
fishery researchers have suggested controlled-access 
and privatization schemes. Controlled-access is usually 
advocated because it offers a potential cap on overall 
fishing effort and greatly facilitates state-required 
monitoring of the resource, harvest levels, and industry. 
Privatization or resolving the common-property 
problem is typically advocated to promote economic 
efficiency and net social benefits to society. 
Prior to considering controlled-access schemes and 
more elaborate regulatory regimes, such as property 
rights and privatization, in the blue crab fishery, we 
first explore open-access regulations. This is necessary 
to demonstrate that resource conservation goals could 
be obtained without addressing the common-property 
and open-access nature of the blue crab fishery. 
Open-access Solutions 
The state currently has an open-access fishery for the 
pot fishery and a limited entry fishery for the dredge 
fishery. There is, however, a delayed entry restriction 
which requires potential entrants to wait two years 
before they may enter the pot fishery. Regulation of the 
fishery includes gear restrictions, time and day and 
week limits, delayed entry, and size and sex 
restrictions. None of these regulations address the root 
problem of over-capitalization--too much effort directed 
at harvesting blue crabs or excessive production costs. 
Alternatively, open-access solutions do not address the 
problem of wasteful exploitation of a resource. 
It has long been advocated that in any fishery in 
which entry is open to all, overfishing and serious 
economic problems will eventually occur. The major 
economic problem is dissipation or reduction of profit. 
Technically, the problem is that revenues less costs less 
a normal return to the operator become zero because 
harvesting costs increase relative to revenues. This 
situation is more commonly referred to as rent 
dissipation. 
In an open-access fishery, production and revenues 
per individual decline while costs per unit of production 
increase. Eventually, overall profit is zero and the 
economic incentives to enter the fishery are diminished. 
Alternatively, it is costing more to produce a given 
level of fish than it should. Under the open-access 
position, production is technically and economically 
inefficient, and society is not receiving the maximum 
possible benefit from the resource. Moreover, some of 
the resources being used to harvest fish could be better 
employed elsewhere in the economy. 
If we think of a pie chart where the area of the pie 
represents total profit or rent given a fixed number of 
fishermen, we can easily see the effects of allowing 
unrestricted entry (Pigure 4). As the number of 
fishermen in the fishery increase, the slice of the profit 
available to each fishermen becomes smaller. 
Eventually, the number of entrants increases to such a 
level that overall profit for the fishery becomes zero. 
All possible profit or rent is dissipated. 
Figure 4. Open-access and Dissipation of Profit 
Percent of resource (profit) as 
entry Into fishery doubles 
12.5 
12.5 
12.5 12.5 
12.5 12.5 
The blue crab regulations for the pot fishery are 
examples of typical open-access, common property 
regulations. They can, if properly implemented, 
address biological concerns; they can never, however, 
resolve the economic problems. Other open-access 
regulations include quotas, trip limits, number of days 
allowed to fish per week, number of gear (pots) allowed 
to fish, gear size or configuration (e.g., cull rings), crew 
size limits, seasonal closures, sanctuaries, and area 
restrictions. In the absence of regulations that control 
access and grant property rights, the common-property, 
open-access fishery will not provide maximum benefits 
to society. Open-access regulations can, however, be 
used to resolve resource problems. 
A quota is the most frequently used open-access 
regulation to control fishing mortality and rebuild fish 
stocks. Quotas typically restrict total annual landings 
to some level consistent with biological objectives such 
as maximi�,c the yield or weight per recruit or set 
harvest levels equal to maximum sustainable yield. 
7 
Quotas can also be modified for a variety of factors. 
For example, quotas can be spread out over time such 
as monthly or quarterly; a quarterly quota might allow 
2,500,000 pounds of hard crabs per quarter. They can 
be imposed on sex and size. In the blue crab fishery, 
for example, a quota of 10,000,000 pounds of hard 
crabs larger than 6.0 inches could be imposed. 
To effectively achieve biological or resource 
conservation goals, quotas must be closely monitored 
and enforced. Managers must take care not to get into 
the borrowing mode (allow some of next year's harvest 
to be taken this year because the fishery has reached its 
stated quota). The borrowing mode is quite typical of 
quota-based management and is one major reason why 
quotas fail to achieve biological and economic goals 
and objectives of management. Also, quotas, when 
borrowing is allowed, typically fail to improve resource 
conditions. 
Most important, however, is that quotas and open­
access regulations fail to address the dissipation or loss 
of rent and do not maximize benefits to society. 
Quotas, in fact, typically worsen economic conditions 
by increasing the cost of fishing per unit of time. 
Quotas may also force too much product on the market 
at one time which can depress prices received by 
watermen. Quotas, unless substantially modified, offer 
no opportunity for society to capture rents from the 
fishery. In the case of the blue crab fishery, quotas 
would likely force rent to zero and Virginia would be 
unable to collect any rent from the fishery. In addition, 
quotas tend to reduce the tax base since taxes are 
imposed on earnings after expenses or profits. 
Under quotas and open-access management, adverse 
economic repercussions are usually not recognized until 
it is too late to do something about the problems. 
Simply, fishermen or boats enter a fishery as long as 
profits can be earned. Fishermen continue harvesting 
the resource until total cost equals total revenue. When 
revenues equal cost, profit is zero, and there is no 
economic incentive for new entrants. Unfortunately, 
over-fishing also usually occurs, even before profit 
becomes zero. 
When total cost and total revenue are equal, there are 
more watermen, vessels, and gear than arc necessary to 
harvest a given level of fish. Harvest levels are in 
excess of socially-desired levels. Production or 
harvesting becomes inefficient since fishing effort is 
redundant or unnecessarily high. Profit is zero and 
society does not receive the maximum possible 
benefits. The total cost of producing a given quantity 
of fish is higher than necessary. The point at which 
revenue equals cost is known as the open-access 
equilibrium (Figure 5). 
Figure 5. Open-access Equilibrium 
Long-run 
sustainable 
E I E ,m Fishing Effort E o, 
Open-access 
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profit= 0.0 
In general, open-access regulations can be classified 
by whether or not they control outputs or inputs. A 
quota is an output control and a limit on the number of 
fishing days is an input control. In the absence of 
controlled-access, output and input controls will seldom 
accomplish economic goals and objectives of resource 
management. fishermen will tend to substitute 
unregulated inputs for regulated factors of production. 
For example, a restriction on the number of pots 
allowed per fishermen might cause fishermen to 
increase the number of days they fish with pots or to 
install more powerful winches so they can pull the pots 
faster. In the case of output controls, particularly 
annual or seasonal quotas on the industry, fishermen 
will "race" to harvest the quota before the fishery is 
closed. ln so doing, profit is typically driven to zero or 
very low levels. 
Limited Entry Solutions 
Commencing in 191 I with Jens Warming's work "On 
rent on fishing grounds," economists and fishery 
administrators have argued that fishery management 
must include limited entry or controlled access. That is, 
the number of vessels, gear, and manpower must be 
restricted in an open-access fishery to prevent 
overharvesting and inefficient production. 
Referring to Figure 5, the open-access equilibrium 
level of effort is E0A; profit or rent for the open-access 
fishery is zero (total revenue minus total cost = E - E = 
0). The same levels of catch and revenue can be 
obtained, however, with E 1 (E 1 < E0A) units of effort. 
More important, profit or rent equal to A - B is 
obtainable with E 1 units of fishing effort. More profit, 
though, can be obtained by finding the level of effort 
and catch associated with maximum profit. The 
maximum profit level of effort is EMEY• and profit 
equals C - D. The maximum profit equilibrium 
corresponds to maximum social benefits and is called 
the maximum economic yield (MEY). 
As such, limited entry and controlled access schemes 
are economic forms of management. Controlled-access 
regulatory stra(egies seek to redistribute income and 
promote economic efficiency. As previously stated, 
limited entry and controlled-access are not necessary to 
realize biological goals of resource management. 
8 
Unfortunately, there are numerous problems with 
limited entry. First, what is the necessary level of 
participants in the fishery? Second, what should be the 
configuration of the industry (e.g., boat size, gear type, 
hull construct:on, engine type, horsepower, many small 
boats with small crew, or few large boats with large 
crew)? Third, who stays and who leaves and what are 
the criteria for remaining? What other regulations will 
also be necessary to achieve biological, social, 
economic, and legal goals of management? 
Most fisheries, and which appears to be the case for 
the blue crab fishery, are already severely over 
capitalized. What additional regulations will be 
necessary to reduce effective effort in the Virginia blue 
crab fishery? Moreover, what information is available 
to establish rational regulations for the fishery? 
One major problem with limited entry that has been 
recognized by researchers is that fishermen will engage 
in "capital-stuffing." In the case of the blue crab 
fishery, a limited entry scheme would likely result in 
watermen increasil1g the number of pots, purchasing 
larger boats or engines, or adding additional equipment 
that allowed pots to be more efficiently fished. The total 
costs of production or harvesting blue crabs would 
eventually increase; as a consequence, profits would 
decline. 
In nearly every fishery throughout the world in which 
limited entry has been implemented, capital stufling has 
occurred and effective effort has not been adequately 
controlled. 
Another problem that often accompanies limited entry 
is a rush of applicants to enter the fishery. This 
typically occurs before limited entry is actually 
implemented or during the planning stages of a limited 
entry program. When this occurs, the fishery typically 
ends up with more boats and fishing power than prior 
to the limited entry program. The bottom line is that 
profit is driven towards zero and society does not 
realize maximum benefits from the fishery if limited 
entry is the only regulation used to regulate a fishery. 
Taxing output is another form of limited entry. Taxes 
are to be set at such a level that the least efficient 
operators are driven out of the fishery. Unfortunately, 
a tax program requires considerable monitoring of 
resource and economic conditions. Taxes must 
frequently be changed in order to maximize benefits. 
Taxes do, however, offer Virginia an opportunity to 
collect needed revenue. Unfortunately, it appears that 
taxing outputs actually forces fishermen to increase 
their fishing effort and subsequent harvest, at least in 
the short to intermediate run. Boat owners typically 
have large fixed costs which they must cover. Taxes 
lower their revenue and leave them no choice but to try 
to increase output and revenue. 
It is important to realize that limited entry may not 
solve the resource problem. The use of limited entry to 
solve the resource problem depends upon how limited 
entry is implemented and other regulations imposed on 
the fishery. If Virginia adopts the conventional 
procedures used to limit entry in which nearly all boats 
currently in the fishery arc allowed to remain, and 
imposes no other regulations, total nominal effort will 
remain constant or increase, and total effective effort 
will likely increase as producers engage in capital 
stuffing. 
There are many other, actually better, ways to restore 
the resource. For example, a very restrictive limit 
(small quota) on harvesting for 1-3 years should, at 
least, theoretically increase resource levels. A low 
quota would be a draconian measure in that there would 
be severe economic hardships imposed on watermen 
who make a living harvesting crabs. In addition, 
processors, dealers, wholesalers, financial institutions, 
and restaurants would be affected by an extremely 
restrictive harvest quota. A restrictive quota or 
moratorium would, however, minimize the time it takes 
to restore the resource. 
We iterate that it is important to understand that 
limited entry is primarily an economic regulatory tool. 
Referring back to the pie chart in Figure 4 and 
assuming we have a crab fishery with only 4 watermen, 
we can assess how profit declines as the number of 
watermen increases. As the number of participants 
increases, assuming all participants are homogeneous 
and operating at maximum capacity, the slice per 
watermen diminishes. As long as profits can be 
realized, people will enter the fishery. Eventually, the 
number of entrants drives profit to zero or very low 
levels for the inefficient operators. At this point, entry 
stops. More important, society does not realize 
maximum benefits from the resource. There are more 
fishermen and vessels than are actually necessary to 
harvest a given level of crabs. 
An alternative to just limited entry is to combine 
limited entry with other regulations. In the crab fishery, 
for example, a limited entry scheme might be combined 
with a restriction on the number of pots an individual 
may be allowed to fish. There may also be restrictions 
on areas and times of year when fishermen are allowed 
to fish, or on gear. It has been shown, however, that 
under limited entry schemes, it is often necessary to 
eventually regulate every aspect of fishing power or 
factor responsible for catching fish to avoid capital 
stuffing. Failure to do so usually does not prevent the 
dissipation of profit and loss of potential benefits to 
society. 
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Implementing a limited entry program for the blue 
crab fishery will likely be very difficult. The optimum 
fleet size and configuration is unknown. A target level 
of fishing mortality or total harvest has not been set. lt 
is unknown how watermen might change their fishing 
power in response to a limited entry program. It is 
likely that a limited entry scheme for blue crabs will 
have to eventually regulate all components of fishing 
power. A limited entry program also does not ensure 
that the citizens of Virginia will receive the maximum 
benefits from the resource. Last, limited entry schemes 
are usually ineffective at controlling mortality and 
generating benefits for species, such as the blue crab, 
that are short-lived and subject to large changes in 
abundance caused by environmental factors. 
l 
Individual Transferable Fishing Effort (ITEs) 
An interesting alternative to limited entry is individual 
transferable effort (ITE). An ITE program can be 
designed that limits the number of participants while 
allowing f1cxibility to watermen to harvest blue crabs. 
If necessary, an ITE program can also incorporate other 
regulations (e.g., cull rings, area closures, and seasonal 
restrictions). An ITE program can also be coupled with 
a limited entry scheme. 
Under an ITE program, watermen could be initially 
allocated a fixed number of fishing days, pot days, or 
number of pots per year which were consistent with 
some specified optimum yield. After the initial 
allocation, holders of ITEs could barter, trade, rent, or 
sell their ITEs to other watermen. Thus, an ITE regime 
allows the total effort to be limited while allowing 
opportunities to improve economic efficiency and 
returns to watermen. 
Implementing an !TE program for blue crabs may be 
quite difficult. First, data on fishing effort arc limited. 
Second, there docs not appear to be an apparent 
relationship between fishing mortality and fishing 
effort. Effort and catch per unit effort (CPUE) appear 
to be uncorrelated; moreover, there are no estimates of 
fishing mortality. Third, fishing operations arc quite 
heterogeneous, and thus, it would be extremely difficult 
to determine the level of effective fishing effort 
necessary to achieve a stated OY. Alternatively, it 
would be difficult to standardize fishing effort to reflect 
the heterogeneity of fishing operations (e.g., how many 
small boat days would be equivalent in fishing power to 
one large boat day). Fourth, the number of pots or gear 
n:strictions would still be necessary under an ITE 
program. Last, the compliance, monitoring, and 
enforcement costs of an !TE program would likely be 
quite high. For example, watermen might have to 
install transponders or a vessel tracking system (VTS) 
to allow VMRC to monitor fishing activities, and 
VMRC might have to adopt a:1 expensive monitoring 
and enforcement program. 
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) 
Another type of controlled-access is the stock 
certificate program or what has become known as the 
individual transferable quota (ITQ). In actuality, an 
ITQ is not really the same as limited entry. It can, 
however, be implemented with a restriction on the 
number of participants. Under an ITQ program, quotas 
or shares, 
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after some initial allocation, arc owned by individuals. 
Holders of ITQs can loan, sell, barter, rent, or give their 
ITQs to whomever they want. The ITQ program, while 
usually limiting the number of participants, conveys 
some notion of ownership of the resource (i.e., conveys 
imperfect property rights). An ITQ only guarantees 
access or the opportunity to harvest a given output 
level, or in the case of the blue crab fishery, a set 
number of crnbs or baskets of crabs. 
Under an ITQ program, the problem of profit or rent 
dissipation typically disappears. Producers now have 
to pay for the use of the fish stock which was 
previously free. Nearly every nation of the world with 
commercial fisheries is currently implementing or 
exploring ITQ-based management. 
In the United States, the surf' clam and ocean quahog 
fisheries are managed by ITQs. The South-Atlantic 
wrcckfish fishery is also managed by ITQs. A great 
lakes fishery of Wisconsin and the herring roe fishery 
of California have a long-history of ITQ management. 
ITQs are being considered for the west coast sablefish 
and halibut fisheries. The southern bluefin tuna fishery 
of Australia is managed by ITQs. ITQs are used to 
manage 23 Canadian fisheries. South Africa manages 
its highly valuable abalone fishery by ITQs. The 
National Marine Fisheries Service issued studies on 
using ITQs to manage and regulate the northwest 
Atlantic sea scallop fishery, the Atlantic and king 
mackerel fisheries, the Gulf shrimp fishery, and the 
Pacific northwest groundfish fishery. 
To date, there has been only a limited analysis of the 
benefits of ITQs. In the southern bluclin tuna fishery of 
Australia, ITQs were responsible for reducing fleet size 
by more than 80%. Profits or net returns, however, 
increased by more than $1 1 .0 million (Australian 
dollars). Fewer, but larger, fish were being harvested. 
The downward trend in parental biomass reversed its 
long-run trend. Boat crews earned substantially more 
income. Rents or monies received from the fishermen 
under the ITQ regulation paid for 44% of management, 
research, and related stock assessment work; prior to 
ITQs, the fishermen paid nothing towards resource 
management. 
The obvious appeal of lTQs is their seemingly 
simplicity. Once the procedures for the initial 
allocation and denomination of tradeable units are 
determined, ITQs arc relatively easy to implement. 
There are, unfortunately, some downsides or problems 
of ITQs. 
First, ITQ-bascd management is, in practice, a 
biomass approach. That is, ITQs seek to reduce total 
landings or a given resource. They can be modified to 
reflect size and sex of fish but this adds to the 
complexity of management. ITQs also tend at least to 
offer the potential for market power. This latter 
problem would probably not happen in the blue crab 
fishery given the large number of small operators. 
Alternatively, an ITQ scheme could be designed that 
prohibits any individual from gaining market 
concentration power. 
ITQs usually arc inadequate, alone, for addressing the 
multi product or multi-species nature of most fisheries. 
That is, it is extremely difficult to deal with the multiple 
product interactions. In the blue crab fishery, an ITQ 
program would have to address size, sex, product form 
(hard vs. soft crabs vs peelers), geographic location, 
time of year, and gear type. ITQs, however, may be 
easier to use to control multiproduct interactions and 
fisheries exploited by different types of gear than other 
types of regulatory strategies. 
Differences in size, sex, and product form typically 
cause a problem known as "high-grading" in ITQ 
management. Fishermen discard the lower valued 
products to retain more of the higher valued products; 
if discard mortality is zero, "high-grading" is not a 
problem. If discard mortality is nonzero, however, 
"high-grading" can pose major problems for the 
resource; the large and more fecund female animals 
usually command the highest prices in the market. 
Discard mortality for the blue crab pot fishery is likely 
to be near zero or extremely low since unwanted crabs 
arc readily culled and returned, generally unham1ed, to 
the environment. Discard mortality in the dredge 
fishery, however, may be high. Overall, high-grading 
would not be expected to cause a serious problem for 
the blue crab fishery . 
Potential Regulatory Strategy for Blue Crabs 
Although the state does not have well defined or 
specified objectives for managing Cal/inectes sapiclus, 
it is reasonable to consider two possibly competing 
objectives of resource management. First, the state 
may want to maximize economic opportunities. 
Second, the state may desire to maximize net economic 
benefits to the citizens of the Commonwealth. Although 
a cumbersome concept, maximization of net benefits to 
the Commonwealth would ensure that all and non users 
of the crab resource would receive maximum benefit 
from resource management. Alternatively, the dollar 
value of the resource assessed by society after 
deducting all costs would be as large as possible. 
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The first objective, maximize economic opportunities, 
is a typical objective of less developed countries 
(LDCs) and coastal communities. The concern in 
LDCs is to create employment opportunities, provide 
food and income or subsistence, expand the tax base, 
a1:d generate foreign currency. The concerns of 
Virginia coastal communities arc similar except for 
subsistence and generating foreign cuncncy. Under the 
objective of maximization of economic opportunities, 
fisheries management focuses on short-run econolllic 
growth. 
Most growth-based policies focus on subsistence and 
capital availability policies. Policies that focus on 
subsistence or capital available typically involve 
training individuals to harvest fishery resources and 
lllaking low-cost loans available. Except for 
underutilized species, growth-based fisheries arc short­
lived. Over-capitalization, excess fishing effort, and 
overharvesting usually occur. Society docs not receive 
maximum benefits and profits are quickly dissipated. 
Another interesting aspect of the growth-based fishery 
is that they usually do not generate the greatest tax­
base. This is particularly true for U.S. fisheries. As the 
number of participants increase, profit declines. As 
profit declines, the tax-base or net income subject to 
taxation declines. 
Consider the tax base for the hard L;t � crab fishery. 
Total revenue in 1992 was $9.1 million. The tax base 
would be equal to total profit or total revenue less total 
cost. Given a constant revenue of $9.1 million, total 
profit and earnings subject to taxation would be smaller 
for a large number of watermen than it would be for a 
few highly-efficient watermen. With a lot of fishing 
firms and a finite resource, cost per unit of output and 
per operating unit would be higher than with fewer 
fishing firms. These conclusions, however, assume that 
the fishery was overcapitalized in 1992. 
The economic growth strategy, by and large, no 
longer characterizes resource managelllent in the United 
States. Fisheries management often has, however, 
focused on economic maintenance. This appears to be 
the case for management of blue crabs as well as many 
other U.S. fisheries. 
In this case, the management agency attempts to 
maintain the status quo in terms of number of 
participants and economic opportunities. The 
management agency may alternatively desire to 
maximize the number of allowable harvesters. 
Unfortunately, the status quo for most fisheries, and 
possibly the blue crab fishery, is incompatible with 
resource levels. Thus, we find that even for the status 
quo strategy, the resource may be ovcrharvcsted and 
potential profits arc not maximized. At a minimum, it 
is likely that there arc too many watermen and fishing 
boats exploiting the blue crab resource, and as a 
consequence, the cost per unit of production is likely to 
be unnecessarily high. 
Managing the fishery to sustain the maximum 
allowable number of harvesters, as is under 
consideration by Maryland, is also a regulatory strategy 
that is not likely to enhance resource and economic 
conditions. This type of objective is void of any type of 
economic optimum other than ensuring employment 
opportunities. It requires determining the configuration 
of the fishing fleet and gear. To satisfy this objective, 
management must design regulations that impose 
extreme inefficiency. An example of an inefficient 
operation would be a 14 foot boat powered by sail in 
which the operator could fish only one pot per day. 
This operation would allow a large number of 
harvesters but their earnings would likely be very low. 
Alternatively, sustaining the maximum number of 
harvesters could be based on economic criteria. This 
would require, however, the management authority to 
determine income levels for fishermen and the optimum 
fleet size and configuration. For example, regulations 
would allow fishermen, on average and year after year, 
to earn a fixed amount of income. This type of 
regulation would likely be rejected by watermen and 
would do little to enhance the economic benefits of the 
crab resource. 
If the state should elect to manage the blue crab 
fishery for the purpose of economic opportunity or 
status quo, the state will not receive the maximum 
economic benefit, and quite likely, not the maximum 
tax revenue from blue crab harvesting. In essence, if 
the state desires to maximize short-run employment or 
limited economic opportunities, continuing previous 
forms of open-access will likely suffice. It will be 
necessary, however, to better define the optimum yield 
to ensure some long or intermediate-run stability in the 
resource. 
On the other hand, if the state desires to maximize net 
benefits from the fishery, individual transferable quotas 
(ITQs) offer the most promise. Under this regime, the 
state could auction off the first-round allocation and 
receive income. Alternatively, the state could allocate 
the initial total allowable catch (TAC) based on 
historical participation but implement a transactions fee 
equal to the cost of managing the blue crab resource. 
For example, if it cost Virginia $100,000 to manage the 
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fishery and the TAC was 40,000,000 pounds, the state 
could implement a transactions fee of $0.25 per I 00 
pounds of ITQ. 
The ITQ scheme could also be modified to allow the 
state to buy and sell quota every year or every season to 
control the rate of resource removal. If the TAC was 
higher than the initial allocation, the state could sell 
ITQs; when the TAC was lower than the initial 
allocation, the state could buy quota. Monies realized 
from the transactions fee and subsequent sales of quota 
could be used by the state to purchase quota and 
manage the resource. 
Historically, the initial allocation of ITQs has been 
based on historical participation in the fishery. 
Transactions fees are usually zero. The Mid-Atlantic 
Fisheries Management Council, however, is 
considering imposing a user fee for surf clams, ocean 
quahogs, and other species. Under an initial allocation 
framework, the management agency simply assigns 
shares to the vessel owners and allows market 
transactions to deal with the buying and selling or 
trading of quota in the future. ITQ schemes in New 
Zealand and Australia appear to be the only ones that 
impose a transactions fee or require holders of quota to 
pay a fee to the nation. 
Of all the possible regulatory schemes for blue crabs, 
the individual transferable quota is likely the most 
promising if the state desires to generate revenues, 
promote resource conservation, and convey maximum 
benefits to the Commonwealth. Implementing an ITQ 
program, however, is likely to be quite difficult. 
If the state decides to initiate an ITQ program to 
manage the blue crab fishery, a variety of issues will 
have to be addressed. First, will the ITQs be issued 
relative to product form or just simply with respect to 
total blue crabs (e.g., an ITQ for hard blue crabs, an 
ITQ for peelers, and an ITQ for soft-shelled crabs). 
The preferred approach is to issue an ITQ for total 
production but only after setting the ITQ relative to 
long-run biological and economic goals and objectives. 
In this manner, watermen can decide how to allocate 
their effort and max1m1ze their net returns. 
Alternatively, watermen have maximum flexibility in 
deciding on a fishing strategy. A total ITQ strategy 
also creates the opportunity for the state to maximize 
tax collections and revenues from the fishery. 
lTQs by gear and resource area also could be 
implemented if managers are concerned about equity 
and temporal problems. Again, however, it is 
preferable that the harvester be allowed to adopt the 
most efficient gear and exploit the areas yielding 
maximum economic returns; this could likely occur 
with an ITQ regime structured to deal with dif
f
erences 
in resource area and gear. 
What Arc Some Likely Problems of ITQs? 
There are three primary problems the state must 
address in an ITQ program for blue crabs: (I) 
transactions fee, user fee, or tax, (2) the setting of an 
annual total allowable catch (TAC), and (3) whether or 
not to establish a centralized market, or at least, 
electronic access to daily market prices for quota. The 
three problems arc not trivial and all involve increased 
costs for the state. The costs, however, should be easily 
recoverable via revenue collection activities (e.g., user 
fee). 
Another potential problem with ITQs is market 
concentration or market power. Although illegal, ITQs 
create the opportunity for buyers to collude and 
purchase large quantities of quota and subsequently 
control the market. It is unknown whether or not there 
is an opportunity for buyers and sellers to control the 
market. It is unlikely that a group of watermen could 
dominate the market since there are many watermen. 
Processors or owners of picking houses, however, may 
have sufficient buying power to collude, and thereby, 
control the exploitation of the resource. This possibility 
needs to be thoroughly examined when considering 
ITQ management. 
A potentially serious problem with ITQs in the crab 
fishery is the need to establish a floor level of TAC and 
harvest rights to the individual harvester. If there is any 
possibility that TAC might be set to zero in a given 
year, watermen will have extreme difficulty in 
borrowing funds to operate their businesses. Financial 
institutions simply will not make loans to a business 
entity in which production might be constrained to zero. 
ITQs also require increased monitoring and 
enforcement. Thus, the state could find that managing 
the blue crab fishery under an ITQ program could 
increase their management and regulatory costs. This 
is currently the situation in the surf clam/ocean quahog 
fishery. The recent stock assessment suggests that the 
TAC or annual fleet quota must be reduced. Industry 
has countered, however, that the assessment is flawed. 
The National Marine Fisheries Service must now redo 
its assessment for surf clams and ocean quahogs. 
Another problem with ITQs is establishing the 
denominations of ITQs. Just like money, ITQs have to 
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be available in easily tradcable denominations. Should 
ITQs be issued in percentage of total allowable catch 
(TAC) or actual harvest units such as pounds and 
baskets? Harvest units appear to be the most common 
denomination for ITQs. 
In general, ITQs work best in small fisheries in which 
the species is long-lived, slow growing, and not subject 
to large random fluctuations in abundance. The blue 
crab is short-lived, fast growing, and probably subject 
to large random fluctuations in abundance. An annual 
total allowable catch (TAC) may, thus, be difficult to 
set at the beginning of each harvesting season. This 
problem can be partly mitigated, however, by imposing 
a minimum TAC regardless of the current conditions of 
the resource; the TAC can be adjusted, only upwards. 
during the season as new information becomes 
available. 
A Remaining Option--Thc lluy llack 
There is growing interest by resource managers in 
reducing fleet size--number of vessels--via a buy back 
scheme. Under this scheme, vessels arc purchased by 
the state or federal government. In New Zealand, the 
ITQ program was coupled with a buy back program. 
Unfortunately, the buy back program funds became 
depleted, and the management agency was unable to 
purchase the number of vessels necessary to achieve 
maximum net social benefits. 
The United States agency, National Marine Fisheries 
Service, is currently investigating a buy back program 
for New England fisheries. The desire is to reduce the 
fleet size by approximately 60-70c7o. It remains 
unknown whether or not an ITQ scheme will be 
coupled with the potential buy back program. 
There are several problems with a buy back program. 
First, there is the problem of which boats should be 
targeted to be purchased. Second, how is the purchase 
price to be determined? Third, the buy back program 
must be coupled with some other regulatory strategies 
preferably an ITQ scheme, to promote maximum 
economic benefits. Fourth, how is the buy back 
program to be financed? Last, there may be so many 
boats in the blue crab fishery, it simply may not be 
economically feasible to consider a buy back program. 
Conclusions 
The blue crab fishery of Virginia is thought to be 
important to several coastal economics; its actual 
importance is not known, though, because of 
inadequate information. The Virginia Institute of 
Marine Science, however, is currently conducting a 
study to determine the economic importance of 
Virginia's commercial fisheries. The blue crab fishery 
has become increasingly important over the past few 
years as other marine resources have declined in 
abundance and experienced downward shifts in demand 
while the worldwide demand for crab meat and related 
products has substantially increased. For example, 
watermen previously dependent on oysters for a 
plurality of income now increasingly depend on crabs. 
It i� believed by research scientists and resource 
managers that effort has increased to the point that the 
short-run and possibly long-run viability of the resource 
is in jeopardy. As a consequence, fishery researchers 
and some administrators have suggested that VMRC 
explore alternative regulations, and in particular, 
limited entry and effort control schemes. 
It is important to recognize that while limited entry 
programs can reduce the overall level of effort and aid 
in resource restoration, limited entry docs not offer the 
best approach for quickly restoring the resource. One 
possible approach for restoring the resource in the 
minimum amount of time is to drastically restrict the 
taking and harvesting of blue crabs. While this strategy 
would minimize the time it takes the resource to 
rebuild, it would also cause severe economic hardships 
for watermen, coastal communities, and businesses 
dependent upon the blue crab fishery. In addition, there 
is no guarantee that restrictive harvest policies will 
rebuild the resource. 
There arc simply too many unknowns in the rebuilding 
equation. These unknowns include environmental 
factors, food availability, predation, and water quality. 
All, except water quality, arc generally uncontrollable. 
Before controlled-access, private property regimes, or 
open-access regulations can be successfully evaluated, 
the state of Virginia and the VMRC must determine the 
objectives of managing the r(!sourcc. Docs VMRC 
want to focus primarily on resource conservation or on 
the benefits to the Commonwealth? Alternatively, docs 
VMRC want to maximize the long-run benefits of the 
resource which requires joint consideration of resource 
conservation and economic benefits? 
In comparison, federal fisheries management, under 
the Magnusom Fisheries Conservation and 
Management Act (MFCMA), is currently focusing on 
managing fisheries to maximize benefits to society. To 
do so, however, requires a bio-economic management 
framework in which the population dynamics and 
economic benefits arc interrelated and jointly 
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considered. Overharvesting or maximum exploitation 
has occurred in nearly every fishery managed under 
MFCMA in which the objective was economic growth 
or maintenance of the fishery or industry. 
Allowing a common-property, open-access strategy to 
continue will not allow the c111zens of the 
Commonwealth to receive maximum benefits from the 
blue crab resource. A common-property, open-access 
strategy, however, will offer maximum employment 
opportunities in the short-run when resource conditions 
are relatively high. In the long-run, the open-access 
fishery will cause some type of biological overfishing, 
loss of profit, and zero or near-zero growth 
opportunities. A case in point is the New England 
groundfish fishery. Since 1977, the number of vessels 
and crew substantially increased. The fishery has 
historically been an open-access fishery. Today, the 
New England Fishery Management Council is having 
to deal with a moratorium on fishing for cod, haddock, 
yellowtail founder, pollack, and redfish (ocean perch). 
If the blue crab resource is really declining as suggested 
by the scientific community, VMRC may have to 
consider the option of drastically limiting the harvesting 
of blue crabs in the near future. 
Limited entry is not a cure-all for the blue crab 
fishery. Other restrictions, such as cull rings and the 
number of pots per individual, will be necessary. 
Alternatively, limited entry will not necessarily limit 
total effective fishing effort and prevent the biological 
and economic waste that potentially occurs with 
overharvesting adult crabs and the harvesting of small 
or lean crabs. It will be necessary to consider 
regulations that also control the age-at-entry and total 
effective effort. 
or the many potential regulatory strategics to solve 
the resource and economic problems, ITQs likely offer 
the most promise for the blue crab fishery. Admittedly, 
the fishery is not an ideal candidate for ITQs, but 
neither have been many of the fisheries of the world 
that have been successfully managed by ITQs. 
Moreover, many of the potential problems with ITQs 
for the blue crab fishery could be resolved by imposing 
a minimum annual TAC. Supplementary regulations, 
however, might also be required with ITQ management 
of the fishery (e.g., cull ring size or restrictions on 
dredges to ensure a reduction in dredge-related 
mortality). ITQs also may have to be designed 
explicitly recognizing the multiproduct nature of the 
fishery; the multiproduct nature, however, should be of 
concern regardless of the form of management. Also, 
ITQs likely offer the best management strategy for 
dealing with multiple products because they allow 
watermen flexibility in deciding how and what to 
produce. 
Primary problems of ITQs for the state will be 
deciding the initial allocation and denomination of 
ITQs and whether or not to implement user-fees. 
Another problem for the state will be determining total 
allowable catches (TA Cs) each year; VMRC will have 
to determine if it has the capability to set TAC to levels 
consistent with resource conditions. Last, VMRC will 
have to decide whether or not there should be a 
minimum annual TAC to allow watermen and crab­
related businesses to obtain loans from financial 
institutions. 
An ITQ program will require additional investment by 
the state for data collection and fishery monitoring 
activities; additional expenditures would be required, 
however, for any regulatory strategy concerned with 
maximizing benefits to the Commonwealth. If an ITQ 
program is to be successful, accurate assessments of 
resource conditions are essential. Accurate assessments 
of blue crab abundance, however, may be difficult since 
there is likely to be a high degree of variability in 
resource abundance and the relationship between 
spawning stock and recruitment. Moreover, monitoring 
of landings and harvesting activities are required for 
any successful ITQ program just as they are for any 
successful regulatory regime. 
Inevitably, there will be some type of market for 
ITQs. Whether or not the market will be comprised of 
many buyers and sellers having little information about 
ITQ prices or a centralized market in which all buyers 
and sellers have access to ITQ price information will 
depend upon decisions made by the state. That is, the 
state will have to decide whether or not to invest in 
creating a centralized market. Thus far, none of the 
U.S. fisheries managed under ITQs have a centralized 
market or electronic bulletin board for disseminating 
information about ITQ prices. It has been shown in 
other ITQ programs and in the case of marketable 
emission or pollution permits for electric power plants, 
however, that if an ITQ program is to be successful, 
there must be some sort of centralized market or 
electronic bulletin board that summarizes ITQ prices. 
In the absence of a centralized exchange or electronic 
posting system, it is unlikely that market equilibrium 
prices for ITQs will form, and as a consequence, 
maximum economic efficiency and social and 
economic benefits may not be realized. 
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